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Introduction 
The relief of poverty has always been a cornerstone of charity law.1 But the suggestion here is 
that, legally speaking, this category of charity may – unnoticed – have now been made 
practically redundant when defining the limits of charitable purposes in the law of England and 
Wales by a relatively obscure provision in the Charities Act 2011. By section 3(1)(j), ‘the relief 
of those in need because of … financial hardship …’ is now also a charitable purpose.2 
Arguably, this is wider than the relief of poverty and therefore renders superfluous in the 
modern law any reliance on relieving poverty for charitable status. A charity may have good 
principled or practical reasons for limiting its objects specifically to the relief of poverty: we 
shall come to those. But the general point suggested with regard to defining the outer limits of 
charitable purposes appears valid. This depends, however, on the interpretation given to ‘the 
relief of those in need because of … financial hardship …’; and on the public benefit test to be 
applied to it. 
Legal definition of charity 
By Charities Act 2011, s 2, being a charitable purpose involves satisfying a two-stage test: first,  
the purpose must be on a list of recognised charitable purposes, set out in Charities Act 2011, 
s 3; and second, it must also be of ‘public benefit’. A third requirement for charitable status is 
being exclusively charitable: by Charities Act 2011, s 1, a charity is an institution established 
for charitable purposes only.3 
Prevention or relief of poverty 
On the list of recognised charitable purposes in Charities Act 2011, s 3(1), the very first item, 
in paragraph (a), is ‘the prevention or relief of poverty’. 
‘Prevention’ 
The word prevention was first introduced into the law in Charities Act 2006, s 2(2)(a). The 
addition of ‘prevention’ is now the only respect in which this charitable purpose, in paragraph 
(a), is indisputably wider than the different charitable purpose of relieving need from financial 
hardship, in paragraph (j), which will be the main focus here. However, it is arguably a 
difference of relatively minor importance. 
 
1 The relief of poverty was mentioned in the first clause of the list of charitable purposes in the Preamble to the 
Charitable Uses Act 1601 (or ‘Statute of Elizabeth’); it was the first of the four principal divisions of charity 
famously stated by Lord Macnaghten delivering the leading judgment in Comrs for Special Purposes of the 
Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (HL), 583; and it is now first on the list of charitable purposes in the Charities 
Act 2011 (s 3(1)(a)). 
2 Originally enacted as Charities Act 2006, s 2(2)(j). This ‘financial hardship’ provision is so little considered that 
the Charity Commission’s guidance Charitable Purposes (September 2013) has nothing to say about it. 




Relief of poverty means alleviating needs arising from the poverty; it is not the same as 
benefiting the poor – it is possible to benefit the poor without ameliorating their poverty.4 
‘Poverty’ 
The most widely cited, and helpful, definition of poverty is that in Re Coulthurst.5 Evershed 
MR, delivering the leading judgment, said: 
‘It is quite clearly established that poverty does not mean destitution; it is a word of 
wide and somewhat indefinite import; it may not unfairly be paraphrased for present 
purposes as meaning persons who have to "go short" in the ordinary acceptation of that 
term, due regard being had to their status in life, and so forth.’ 
So, widows and orphans of bank workers could be regarded as in ‘poverty’. 
Public benefit 
The public benefit requirement for relieving poverty is minimal. First, the form of relief must 
be socially beneficial: not antisocial.6 Secondly, it must be for the relief of poverty amongst a 
class of poor people and not be for particular beneficiaries;7 accordingly, the provision can be 
for a relatively small group and they can all have a personal nexus – for example, they can all 
be relatives, or employees: Dingle v Turner.8 So, a trust for those ‘in special need’ among 50 
relatives has been held a charitable relief of poverty;9 and a trust for ‘the poor and needy’ 
among a smaller class of 26 relatives, plus issue born during a 21-year period, has been held a 
charitable relief of poverty.10 A possible justification for the minimal numbers that need to be 
helped in order to satisfy the public benefit requirement is that any relief of poverty benefits 
the general public, by reducing the burden on the state – the taxpayer.11 
Relief of those in need because of financial hardship 
The relief of those in need because of financial hardship is now a listed charitable purpose. It 
forms part of a wider category stated in Charities Act 2011, s 3(1)(j): ‘the relief of those in 
need because of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage’. 
‘Relief’ 
Relief has essentially the same meaning as in relieving poverty: it means a need arising from 
their condition (‘youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage’) is 
being remedied.12 
 
4 Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd v A-G [1983] Ch 159 (Ch), 171. 
5 [1951] Ch 661 (CA), 665-66. 
6 A-G v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2012] UKUT 420 (TCC), [2012] WTLR 977. 
7 It is no objection that the property is distributable at once, rather than held as an endowment with only the income 
distributed – if the provision is not, in substance, for particular individuals: Re Scarisbrick [1951] Ch 622 (CA). 
8 [1972] AC 601 (HL). The law has not been changed by the Charities Act: A-G v Charity Commission for England 
and Wales [2012] UKUT 420 (TCC), [2012] WTLR 977, [39] (although that case probably did not correctly state 
the prior law: see Jonathan Garton, Public Benefit in Charity Law (OUP 2013), para 5.280). The case added, [76]-
[80], that the same test may apply for the ‘prevention’ of poverty, where the prevention is very close to relief, 
because the prevention is of impending poverty; but, where the prevention is staving off distant risks (eg, through 
general financial advice) then benefit to a wider public may be required. 
9 Re Cohen [1973] 1 WLR 415 (Ch). 
10 Re Segelman [1996] Ch 171 (Ch). 
11 Alison Dunn ‘As “Cold as Charity”?: Poverty, Equity and the Charitable Trust’ (2000) 20 LS 222, esp  222 and 
233-34. (But for the view that this is an unjustified historical anomaly, see Moffat’s Trusts Law: Text and 
Materials (eds Jonathan Garton, Rebecca Probert and Gerry Bean, 7th edn, CUP 2020), 930-31.) 
12 Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd v A-G [1983] Ch 159 (Ch), 171. 
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‘Those in need because of financial hardship’ 
There appear to be no judicial pronouncements explaining ‘those in need because of financial 
hardship’;13 although Andrew Smith J accepted that those in social housing in the Netherlands 
were in need of accommodation because of financial hardship within the meaning of the 
provision, in Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep.14 This is possibly a first 
indication that the judges will see financial hardship as wider, and easier to find, than poverty.15 
By contrast, the leading specialist texts appear doubtful as to whether ‘those in need because 
of financial hardship’ form a wider category than those in ‘poverty’.16 But it is plain from 
authority that that a person can be in ‘need’ even if they are not poor: Joseph Rowntree 
Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd v A-G.17 And there would have been no point in 
introducing the financial hardship provision unless there was a meaningful distinction from 
poverty: the law’s presumption is that everything in a statute is independently significant.18 
There must clearly be some difference between need from financial hardship and 
poverty. It is suggested that there is likely to be an appreciable difference; because – at least 
given the context that poverty is itself already a more extensive category in charity law than 
the ordinary layperson might think – this is the natural meaning of the words ‘in need  because 
of financial hardship’, in their statutory context. To take a topical example, those solidly in the 
middle class who have lost their income during the current pandemic, have fearfully consumed 
their life savings to meet day-to-day expenses, and are now shamefacedly borrowing from 
relatives or friends to afford the mortgage or school fees, etc, could reasonably be described as 
in need from financial hardship. And it is easy to recall other situations – investment scandals, 
pension collapses, etc – where those well outside the range of poverty could sensibly have been 
described as in need from financial hardship. Helping such people would admittedly be a long 
way from the popular notion of ‘charity’: but the legal concept of charity is a long way from 
 
13 Nor do the Parliamentary debates help. The Minister of State, Home Office, Baroness Scotland, said about the 
list of charitable purposes, originally in Charities Act 2006 (HL Deb 20 January 2005, vol 668, col 885): ‘The 
Government's intention is to clarify and codify the law, rather than to extend it significantly.’ But there were 
extensions, and we are left wondering what ‘significantly’ meant. According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 
delivering the leading judgment in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL), 634 and 640, only ‘clear’ ministerial 
statements are admissible as an aid to construction, which this is not. There is no reference to the ‘financial 
hardship’ provision specifically. The Minister for the Cabinet Office, Hilary Armstrong, spoke about avoiding 
statements that might be used in future litigation, saying very uncharitably (HC Deb 26 June 2006, vol 448, col 
22): ‘I have learned already that there are incredible legal issues here, and I do not want to say anything that will 
lead me into giving lawyers any more money than they are already entitled to.’ 
14 [2014] EWHC 3103 (Comm), esp [261]. 
15 Compare the agonising in Re Niyazi's Will Trusts [1978] 1 WLR 910 (Ch), where Megarry V-C held a modest 
testamentary trust to construct a working men’s hostel in an area of 1960s Cyprus suffering a housing shortage to 
be only just a charitable relief of poverty, saying (915) ‘the case is desperately near the borderline’. 
16 Hubert Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2010), 168, 
sees no extension to the previous law; while William Henderson, Jonathan Fowles and Julian Smith (eds), Tudor 
on Charities (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015), para 2.209, concedes only that there might be a small extension, 
saying need from financial hardship ‘almost completely overlaps with … poverty’. Although, helpfully to the 
argument made here, the passage does continue, ‘However, the scope of “the relief of financial hardship” may be 
wider than the relief of poverty because although as a matter of charity law “poverty” is a relative term, persons 
who might not generally be described as poor might suffer from financial hardship from time to time’. 
17 [1983] Ch 159 (Ch), 174. So, non-profit provision of age-adapted housing was held charitable as a relief of the 
needs of the elderly: there selling leases to those able to afford them. 
18 Diggory Bailey and Luke Norbury (eds), Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (7th edn, LexisNexis 2017), sect 
21.2, explains (notes omitted): ‘There is a presumption that every word in an enactment is to be given meaning 
… Given the presumption that Parliament does nothing in vain, the court must endeavour to give significance to 
every word of an enactment. It is presumed that if a word or phrase appears, it was put there for a purpose and 
must not be disregarded.’ 
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the popular concept.19 And why should such financial casualties of the current pandemic be 
undeserving of charity’s concern, given the width of ‘charity’ in other respects, if helped in a 
suitably limited and targeted way?20 
If it is correct that those in need from financial hardship form a wider category that 
those in poverty, and especially if they form a significantly wider category, relying on the relief 
of poverty for charitable status unnecessarily assumes the burden of proving ‘poverty’ – unless 
there is some other difference making the relief of poverty a legally attractive category option 
to rely on. This raises the question whether the financial hardship category enjoys all the same 
benefits as the poverty category when it comes to the public benefit test. 
Public benefit 
We can only claim that the financial hardship purpose has rendered the relief of poverty 
purpose effectively redundant, when defining the outer limits of charity law, if in the financial 
hardship category the public benefit test can be satisfied as easily as in the poverty category: 
that is, even when those who may benefit are numerically small and/or have a personal nexus. 
The better view of the law appears to be that the poverty category enjoys no advantage over 
the financial hardship category: the two are in the same position. But the matter is debatable. 
A sufficiently large section of the public 
The most authoritative general statement regarding the sort of numbers that need to benefit for 
a purpose to be of public benefit is that the benefits must be for the whole public, or a 
sufficiently large section of it – examples given were the inhabitants of a town or parish – it 
must not be for a set of private individuals: Verge v Somerville.21 But a sufficiently large section 
of the public does not have a precise meaning; it markedly varies with the context.22 In 
particular, in Gilmour v Coats23 Lord Simonds, delivering the leading judgment, said: 
‘[I]t is, I think, conspicuously true of the law of charity that it has been built up not 
logically but empirically. It would not, therefore, be surprising to find that, while in 
every category of legal charity some element of public benefit must be present, the court 
had not adopted the same measure in regard to different categories, but had accepted 
one standard in regard to those gifts which are alleged to be for the advancement of 
education and another for those which are alleged to be for the advancement of religion, 
and it may be yet another in regard to the relief of poverty.’ 
Looking at cases of what we would today call ‘need because of financial hardship’, 
seemingly the most helpful authority regarding minimum numbers treated the dependants of 
six victims killed in a disaster as a sufficient section of the public: Cross v Lloyd-Greame.24 
 
19 Most notoriously in the charitable status of expensive fee-charging schools: R (Independent Schools Council) v 
Charity Commission for England and Wales; A-G v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2011] UKUT 
421 (TCC), [2012] Ch 214. See generally Mary Synge, The 'New' Public Benefit Requirement: Making Sense of 
Charity Law? (Bloomsbury 2015), esp 29-32. Countless examples exist of charities primarily benefiting the 
middle class and even the well-to-do, such as in the arts. 
20 For some observations on possible practical application of this view, see David Wilde and Imogen Moore, 
‘Charitable Relief of Financial Hardship: the Public Benefit Requirement’ [2021] PCB 36, esp 41-42. 
21 [1924] AC 496 (PC). Providing for soldiers returning from war was held to benefit a sufficient section of the 
public. 
22 For high judicial recognition of this, see the citations in William Henderson, Jonathan Fowles and Julian Smith 
(eds), Tudor on Charities (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015), para 1.144. 
23 [1949] AC 426 (HL), 449. 
24 (1909) 102 LT 163 (Ch). When the crew of two fishing boats were lost, an appeal was made for ‘relief’ of their 
dependants. There is no mention that they were reduced to immediate or imminent poverty – although that might 
be speculated upon. The appeal raised more than the trustees believed the dependants should receive and the 
trustees planned application of the surplus to similar future disasters. Despite a concession by counsel for one 
widow that the fund would place her (164) ‘in a position of affluence’, Eve J was not persuaded there was a surplus 
in the charitable fund to be applied cy-près – although he referred the matter for consideration by a judge in 
chambers. So, it is not clear that the trust was a response to poverty; and it is tolerably clear that the dependants 
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And amongst other ‘need’ cases within Charities Act 2011, s 3(1)(j) – beyond need due to 
financial hardship – a gift to just 10 blind girls and 10 blind boys has been held charitable, as 
relieving needs of the disabled: Re Lewis.25 No doubt the gift to the blind children benefited 
more than just the recipients: the wider public also benefited through their care and education, 
meaning the children would contribute more to society and perhaps cost the taxpayer less. 
However, a similar case of indirect benefit to society can also be made for relieving need due 
to financial hardship: that it reduces the range of social ills associated with hardship – suicide 
and self-harm, domestic abuse and family break-up, mental health and addiction issues, 
disrupted education of children and supportive social networks, etc. If we save even only 20 or 
so individuals – and those around them – from such hardship, why is that not of public benefit 
(in the legal sense)? If this reading of the case law is correct, we are apparently dealing in 
numbers entirely comparable to the relief of poverty. 
The point is not completely clear. Contrast in particular 33 residents of an old people’s 
home held not a sufficient section of the public for a relief of need due to age.26 But this case 
has been criticised at length and appears to be wrong on the point.27 
Personal nexus 
In Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd,28 the House of Lords decided that as a general 
rule of charity law, there is only private – not public – benefit if those who can benefit are all 
defined by a ‘personal nexus’: that is, they are all linked to one person, or to several people – 
equally to one company or several companies. Links mentioned were being family members 
or employees. A trust to educate children of employees of a group of companies was held not 
charitable: those who could benefit (even though they were numerous) were all linked to the 
companies. The case recognised that the relief of poverty is an exception to the general personal 
nexus rule. Would relief of need due to financial hardship also be an exception? 
It is important to emphasise that the personal nexus proposition is probably less absolute 
than is generally thought. It was only indicated in Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities to be a 
general rule: it was recognised that there might be other exceptions beyond relief of poverty.29 
And it is worth noting that whether the personal nexus rule is correct at all was questioned by 
high authority (although the criticism may have stemmed from a failure to recognise it was 
 
were not restricted to what was necessary to relieve poverty. In today’s terms, this appears to be a relief of need 
from the financial hardship of losing a breadwinner. Peter Luxton, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001), para 5.03, 
specifically views the case as, ‘Outside the relief of poverty’. 
25 [1955] Ch 104 (Ch). It could be said that all blind children was the class to benefit, but with particular 
individuals to be selected. However, it is arguably disingenuous to talk about a large class when it is clear that the 
benefits will go to only a few individuals within it: Joseph Jaconelli, ‘Adjudicating on Charitable Status - a 
Reconsideration of the Elements’ [2013] Conv 96, 105-6. 
26 Re Duffy [2013] EWHC 2395 (Ch). 
27 Mary Synge, ‘Charitable Status: not a negligible matter’ (2016) 132 LQR 303. (Even on its own terms the case 
seems wrong. The gift was £¼m. It could therefore presumably have benefited numerous future residents as well. 
But this point was not considered. This was possibly because the home had closed down by the date of the hearing. 
However, this fact should not have been relevant to consideration of possible cy-près application of the gift to 
other similar charities. Note also, Re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund [1958] Ch 300 (Ch) (affd [1959] Ch 62 (CA)), 
305, where it was believed around 30 disaster victims were not a sufficient section of the public, but without 
argument or decision on the point. Again the reasoning looks suspect even on its own terms: it appears the families 
of the victims were not considered, as they probably ought to have been.) 
28 [1951] AC 297 (HL). 
29 ibid, 307-8, Lord Simonds, delivering the leading judgment. An example given was government employees, all 
linked to the same employer: such a case, it was said, would be dealt with ‘on its merits’ – recognising that a trust 
for all the employees in an industry, with various employers, can be of public benefit; so it might be anomalous 
if, by chance, it was a nationalised industry, all with a single employer. 
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potentially subject to reasoned exceptions).30 In that context, the House of Lords has expressly 
indicated since, albeit obiter, in Dingle v Turner,31 that the personal nexus rule is subject to 
numerous exceptions: indeed, it is a rule that should only apply where there is a justification 
for it – as in the Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities case, where an attempt was being made to 
finance employee perks at the taxpayer’s expense, under the guise of charity, for the benefit of 
the companies.32 The best rationalisation we have seems to be that of Chesterman: the personal 
nexus rule negatives charitable status only where a settlor is self-interested; an exception from 
the general rule can be made where they are altruistic.33 (Watkin provides a counter-argument: 
the terms of an instrument should decide charitable status, not the motives of the settlor.34 In 
other words, the altruism test would produce a strange result – exactly the same instrument 
would be charitable, or not, depending on who declared it. But the law does have to confront 
such issues: for example, exactly the same instrument might be a valid trust or a sham 
depending on the intentions behind it – and at least there would be a trigger to investigation 
here, mention of a personal nexus, whereas a trust of practically any sort could turn out to be a 
sham.) On this altruism test, it is hard to envisage that relieving need due to financial hardship, 
even for those with a personal nexus – for example employees – should violate the personal 
nexus rule any more than relief of poverty does. 
Indeed, there may be direct authority that need cases, such as need from financial 
hardship, are an exception to the personal nexus rule. The very foundation of the ‘poor 
employees’ line of cases – showing that relieving poverty amongst employees is outside the 
personal nexus rule – Re Gosling35 seems not to have been a poverty case at all, but a needs 
case. A trust ‘for the purpose of pensioning off the old and worn-out clerks of the firm of 
Goslings and Sharpe’ was held to be for a sufficient section of the public and charitable, despite 
those able to benefit all sharing a common employer. Byrne J is reported to have said that the 
trust came within relief of the aged and the impotent;36 what we would call today the relief of 
those in need because of age or ill-health.37 He added38 that he thought ‘poor clerks of the firm 
and those unable to properly provide for themselves and their families are intended to be 
benefited’. This appears to envisage the relief of poverty; but also an extension beyond that, to 
what we would call today the relief of those in need because of financial hardship; arising from 
their age and ill-health. Overall, it looks like the judge was not treating the trust as restricted to 
the relief of poverty – and indeed this seems correct, given the terms of the trust. One of our 
finest jurists, Atiyah, interpreted Re Gosling as not being a poverty case.39 And in Dingle v 
 
30 In particular, Lord MacDermott, dissenting in the Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities case itself, 317-18; Lord 
Denning MR in IRC v Educational Grants Association Ltd [1967] Ch 993 (CA), 1009; and Lord Cross, writing 
extrajudicially – Geoffrey Cross, ‘Some Recent Developments in the Law of Charity’ (1956) 72 LQR 187, 190. 
31 [1972] AC 601 (HL), 623-25, Lord Cross – now acting judicially – delivering the leading judgment.  
32 The personal nexus rule had previously been side-stepped on occasion, where it appeared to make no sense. In 
Re White's Will Trusts [1951] 1 All ER 528 (Ch), providing a rest home for working nurses was held charitable 
as an advancement of the efficiency of their hospital. A potential ‘personal nexus’ problem, arising from the nurses 
all having the same employer, was avoided by interpreting the trust as being, not to benefit the nurses, but to 
benefit the hospital instead. 
33 Michael Chesterman, Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1979), 317-19. (See also 
AL Goodhart, ‘Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities’ (1951) 67 LQR 164 (note).) 
34 Thomas Glyn Watkin, ‘Charity: the Purport of “Purpose”’ [1978] Conv 277, 281-83. 
35 (1900) 48 WR 300 (Ch). 
36 At the time of Re Gosling, courts tended to determine charitable status by reference to the charitable purposes 
listed in the Preamble to the Charitable Uses Act 1601 (or ‘Statute of Elizabeth’ – later repealed by Charities Act 
1960, s 38(1)). The list began (put into modern English), ‘The relief of aged, impotent and poor people…’ The 
words aged, impotent, and poor were treated disjunctively: each was seen as an independent charitable purpose. 
37 (1900) 48 WR 300 (Ch), 301. 
38 ibid. 
39 PS Atiyah, ‘Public Benefit in Charities’ (1958) 21 MLR 138, 144-45. 
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Turner,40 Lord Cross, delivering the leading judgment, said of Byrne J’s decision that a 
personal nexus was no obstacle to the trust in Re Gosling being charitable, ‘It is to be observed 
that he does not confine what he says there to trusts for the relief of poverty as opposed to other 
forms of charitable trust’. 
Accordingly, it seems that the Charity Commission is probably wrong to suggest that a 
personal nexus among those to benefit necessarily means a relief of need (rather than poverty) 
does not satisfy the public benefit test.41 
Mutual benefit or self-help funds 
The limited situation of mutual benefit or self-help funds may possibly involve a minor 
distinction between poverty and need from financial hardship when it comes to public benefit. 
Re Hobourn Aero Components Ltd's Air Raid Distress Fund42 appears to decide that such funds 
can only be of public benefit, and so charitable, if they relieve poverty. The decision on its facts 
would certainly appear to exclude from charitable status relieving other forms of need.43 But, 
overall, the case law is in fact rather unclear about whether the Hobourn case’s approach is 
correct.44 
A modernisation argument for the same public benefit test to be applied to both ‘poverty’ 
and ‘financial hardship’ 
Beyond a strict legal argument based on the authorities, a wider modernising argument can also 
be made aimed at persuading the Charity Commission – and more importantly the courts, who 
have the final say – to treat the newly-listed financial hardship category as generously as the 
traditional poverty category has been treated when applying the public benefit test. Historically, 
poverty has received special treatment: reflecting the practical wisdom of the judges. In 
particular, businesses, and those associated with them, have been allowed and in turn 
encouraged to ‘look after their own’, with appropriately targeted support for individuals among 
their workers, through charity; with the fiscal benefits this brings. If encouragement of such 
virtuous humanity and commendable social responsibility is to be preserved in charity law 
today, arguably we ought to update. In contemporary times, it is increasingly unattractive for 
anyone in business to establish a fund for the relief of ‘poverty’ amongst employees – thereby 
opening the business up to the accusation that its pay and conditions have left workers in 
‘poverty’. ‘Poverty pay’ is a toxic slogan – no matter what explanations are given that a fund 
is for workers in adverse circumstances due to extraneous factors.45 This accusation can often 
be smoothed over by including in the class to benefit ex-employees, relatives, dependants, etc. 
But, in the age of the start-up, many recent businesses have no immediate prospect of a 
significant body of long-serving ex-employees they can point to, in order to credibly claim that 
 
40 [1972] AC 601 (HL), 618.  
41 Charity Commission, Public Benefit: analysis of the law relating to public benefit (September 2013), para 71, 
citing Re Hobourn Aero Components Ltd's Air Raid Distress Fund [1946] Ch 194 (CA). That case was, in fact, 
decided applying the distinct rule that mutual benefit or self-help funds do not (usually) satisfy the public benefit 
test: the observations about personal nexus were obiter, and made at a time when the personal nexus rule was less 
understood. 
42 [1946] Ch 194 (CA). 
43 From 1940 to 1944 employees of a company made regular contributions to a war emergency fund. Its main 
purpose was to help contributors who were victims of air raids; no means test was imposed on help. This was held 
not charitable. 
44 It is possible that even relieving poverty is not charitable – or at least not unless there is a discretion involved: 
see the review of the cases in William Henderson, Jonathan Fowles and Julian Smith (eds), Tudor on Charities 
(10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015), paras 1.058-1.063. And, on the other hand, there is equally authority that 
charitable status is not restricted to relieving poverty: Neville Estates Ltd v Madden [1962] Ch 832 (Ch), esp 853-
54 (and see also London Hospital Medical College v IRC [1976] 1 WLR 613 (Ch)). 
45 And no matter how prevalent in-work poverty is: the Joseph Rowntree Foundation indicates 13% of workers 
are in poverty, rising from 10% 20 years ago, with more people in poverty now living in a working household 
than a non-working household (UK Poverty 2019/20, JRF Annual Report). 
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those who have left and fallen on hard times since are the real concern. While euphemisms can 
be used in place of ‘poverty’, this runs the risk that they may be interpreted as going outside 
the legal meaning of ‘poverty’. Furthermore, applicants to such funds may be more likely to 
apply, and more comfortable applying, if the potentially stigmatising label of ‘poverty’ is not 
associated with the funds. The words ‘financial hardship’ would probably be much more 
acceptable to all: but given the argument made here, that financial hardship is wider than 
poverty, these words only confer charitable status in this context if the same special public 
benefit rules apply to both. If our agenda is to update charity law to match contemporary social 
circumstances, it is suggested there is a strong case for adopting the same public benefit 
approach now to financial hardship as has been taken in the past to poverty. 
A consequence of the suggested approach would be treating financial hardship in the 
same way as poverty when it comes to the relief of relatives, as well as employees, but this 
does not seem materially more anomalous or objectionable than the current position regarding 
relatives.46 
Avoiding unnecessary distinctions in the law 
An advantage of having the same public benefit test for both poverty and financial hardship 
would be eliminating any need for the courts to scrutinise the borderline between the two when 
determining charitable status – doubtless a troublesome borderline to draw. If both are 
charitable on the basis of the same public benefit test, only the wider outer limits of financial 
hardship need to be delimited. Unfortunately, the exact borderline of poverty would still need 
to be drawn for some legal purposes (for example, deciding whether a charity whose objects 
were limited specifically to the relief of poverty was straying outside it, or how the charity’s 
property should be used when applied under a cy-près scheme47) but we would at least be 
minimising the need. 
Consistency with the scheme of the legislation 
Is the argument here is for similarity of treatment when it comes to the public benefit 
requirement consistent with Charities Act placing poverty and financial hardship in distinct 
paragraphs of the statutory code – especially when it might potentially lead to financial 
hardship being treated differently in public benefit terms from the other items listed together 
with it in the same paragraph (need from youth, age, ill-health, disability, or other 
disadvantage)? There is an obvious connection between poverty and financial hardship 
suggesting similarity of treatment on public benefit is appropriate, despite their appearing in 
different paragraphs: they are both points on the same continuum of financial difficulties – they 
are simply degrees of the same thing. The public benefit test is well known for varying from 
purpose to purpose,48 but relieving either poverty or financial hardship can be seen as basically 
serving the same purpose, despite being placed in different statutory paragraphs; while there 
would be nothing exceptional about one item in a paragraph being treated differently from 
another item within the same paragraph.49 The paragraphs are simply a list of purposes whose 
structure appears to indicate nothing about the separate public benefit requirement, which is 
pervasively flexible throughout. 
Reasons for the continuing relevance of relief of poverty 
A possible objection to the overall argument made here is inconsistency: we have suggested 
that financial hardship must be different from poverty because everything in a statute should 
 
46 Likewise for others: in Re Young [1955] 1 WLR 1269 (Ch) the relief of poverty among members of a testator’s 
club was held charitable. 
47 Charities Act 2011, s 67(3). 
48 Above, n 22. 
49 Above, n 8, for a suggestion by the judges that ‘prevention’ may be treated differently from ‘relief’ of poverty 
within the same paragraph. 
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be seen as independently significant – but we are concluding from this that poverty is therefore 
redundant in the statute because subsumed within the wider category. It is tempting to suggest 
that relief of poverty was included as a faithful codification of the earlier law; and the fact that 
financial hardship might subsume it was simply not considered. However, that would be to 
seriously underestimate the very considerable perspicacity of the Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel. Assuming the issue was foreseen, from a drafting perspective the acknowledged 
doubts about whether the courts would find that relief of poverty is completely subsumed 
within relief of financial hardship – particularly with regard to the applicable public benefit test 
– would have made separate listing of these two essential. And there are good legal reasons for 
listing the relief of poverty, even if it is covered by the wider relief of financial hardship. Its 
inclusion affirms beyond any question the charitable status of existing charities for the relief 
of poverty; and it provides an explicit framework, for the future, for those charities that wish 
to do so, to limit their objects to the relief of poverty specifically – those charities that wish to 
ensure their relief is directed solely to the most deprived; and which are then able to utilise this 
focus in fundraising, recruitment of volunteers, etc. Including both poverty and financial 
hardship in the statute as separate categories is therefore meaningful despite the fact that one 
includes the other. The relationship between the two is perhaps best expressed by saying that 
relief of poverty is now a subcategory of the wider relief of financial hardship; a subcategory 
that charities may wish to adopt from choice. 
Conclusion 
Conservatism is, of course, a powerful force in the law. The traditional focus on the relief of 
poverty in books, the teaching of law, and in legal practice, can be expected to continue. But, 
technically, the charitable purpose of relieving poverty now seems to be reduced to a 
subcategory – although the charitable purpose of preventing poverty retains some modest 
independent territory. The position is not entirely clear, but the suggestion here has been that, 
on the better view of the law, the more extensive charitable purpose of relieving those in need 
because of financial hardship now encompasses all that relieving poverty covers and more. 
Relying on this wider category to claim charitable status eliminates the need to engage with 
the potentially troublesome issue of what amounts to ‘poverty’. However, there will clearly be 
charities that, from choice, wish to limit their objects specifically to the relief of poverty. 
Is a move in charity law from ‘poverty’ to ‘hardship’ desirable? If such a change were 
(contrary to the argument made here) merely one of legal vocabulary – exchanging two 
different names for essentially the same thing – it might nevertheless still be desirable. 
Questions have been asked pertaining to the legal aptness of the word ‘poverty’ in the context 
of the modern welfare state.50 Ideas of ‘relative poverty’ can be resorted to; but ‘financial 
hardship’ might perhaps be more universally assented to than ‘poverty’. But if a move from 
‘poverty’ to ‘hardship’ is one of real substance – a significant expansion to the scope of charity 
– whether that is desirable is largely a matter of political sympathies and is liable to be 
contentious. Some would undoubtedly not welcome yet another extension, beyond helping 
only the truly deprived, for the public fiscal subsidy of charitable status enjoyed by privately 
directed philanthropy. However, others will undoubtedly argue that assisting those in 
temporary need through a difficult period is more in the true spirit of charity than continually 
promoting welfare dependency. Perhaps we all need a little more charity… 
 
50 Michael Chesterman, Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1979), 139-44. Although, 
of course, much charitable work is carried on abroad where that context does not exist in the same way. 
